USA v. Rodolfo Ascencion-Carrera by unknown
2011 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
2-16-2011 
USA v. Rodolfo Ascencion-Carrera 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Rodolfo Ascencion-Carrera" (2011). 2011 Decisions. 1781. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011/1781 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2011 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
 
 
        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
________ 
 
No. 10-1410 
_________ 
 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
RODOLFO ASCENCION-CARRERA, 
                                                        Appellant 
 
________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2-09-cr-00087-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable Legrome D. Davis 
 
 _______ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
February 14, 2011 
 
Before: SLOVITER, HARDIMAN, and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: February 16, 2011) 
 
______ 
 
OPINION 
______ 
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SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
Rodolfo Ascencion-Carrera pled guilty to reentering the United States illegally 
after deportation in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326 and was sentenced to 46 months 
imprisonment.  Ascencion-Carrera now appeals his sentence, arguing that the District 
Court plainly erred in enhancing his sentence because his prior conviction under Cal. 
Penal Code § 261.5(a) (statutory rape) does not constitute a crime of violence for 
purposes of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) (2008).1  
We will affirm.2
 Under the Sentencing Guidelines, an alien who is convicted of illegally reentering 
the United States has a base offense level of eight.  U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(a).  A defendant 
charged with illegal reentry who has sustained a felony conviction for a “crime of  
 
                                              
1 Ascencion-Carrera has abandoned his argument that the District Court plainly 
erred in concluding that his statutory rape conviction constitutes an “aggravated felony” 
for statutory maximum sentencing purposes in light of this court’s intervening decision in 
Restrepo v. Att’y Gen., 617 F.3d 787 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 
2 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231 and we have 
appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742.  Where, as here, the 
defendant failed to call an erroneous Guidelines calculation to the District Court’s 
attention, we review for plain error.  Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b).  We must find: (1) an error 
was committed, (2) the error was plain, and (3) the error affected the defendant’s 
substantial rights.  United States v. Knight, 266 F.3d 203, 206 (3d Cir. 2001).  If all three 
conditions are met, we may exercise our discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if 
“the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial 
proceedings.”  Id.  With respect to this final step, we have held that we will generally 
exercise our discretion to recognize a plain error in the misapplication of the Sentencing 
Guidelines.  Id. at 206-07 n.7. 
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violence” is subject to a sixteen-level enhancement.3  Id. § 2L1.2(b).  The Application 
Notes define a “crime of violence” to mean, inter alia, “statutory rape” or “sexual abuse 
of a minor.”  Id. § 2L1.2 cmt. n.1(B)(iii).  As a preliminary matter, we agree with 
Ascencion-Carrera that, to avoid redundancy, this case is properly analyzed under the 
enumerated predicate of statutory rape, not sexual abuse of a minor.4
Even if we were to find that the District Court committed error in determining that 
Cal. Penal Code § 261.5 categorically qualifies as a crime of violence under the 
Guidelines, the more difficult inquiry is whether any such error was plain.
  See United States v. 
Landmesser, 378 F.3d 308, 312-13 (3d Cir. 2004) (Guidelines must be interpreted so as 
to avoid surplusage). 
5
                                              
3 In this case, the sixteen-level enhancement resulted in a Guidelines range of 46-
57 months, significantly higher than the otherwise applicable sentencing range.   
  Although the 
only courts of appeals to squarely address the issue have held that § 261.5 does not 
comport with the generic definition of statutory rape under the Guidelines, see United 
 
4 Indeed, were we to analyze under the sexual abuse of a minor predicate, 
Ascencion-Carrera’s argument for plain error might be more forceful.  Apart from any 
arguments regarding the age of consent, § 261.5 would likely not categorically qualify as 
sexual abuse of a minor under the illegal reentry guideline because it criminalizes 
nonabusive conduct, e.g., consensual sex between a person one day shy of 18 and a 
person who has just turned 21.  See, e.g., United States v. Lopez-Solis, 447 F.3d 1201 (9th 
Cir. 2006) (Tennessee statutory rape law not categorically sexual abuse of a minor under 
previous Guidelines because it proscribes sexual conduct between 17-year-old and 22-
year-old). 
 
5 We assume without deciding that the statute of conviction is broader than the 
generic form of the crime set forth in the federal enhancement provision because it 
defines the age of consent at eighteen rather than sixteen.   
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States v. Lopez-DeLeon, 513 F.3d 472, 475 (5th Cir. 2008) (Cal. Penal Code § 261.5(c) 
not categorically a crime of violence under illegal reentry guideline); United States v. 
Rodriguez-Guzman, 506 F.3d 738, 746-47 (9th Cir. 2007) (same), neither the Supreme 
Court, this court, nor several other courts of appeals have decided the issue.6
                                              
6 In United States v. Hernandez-Castillo, 449 F.3d 1127, 1131 (10th Cir. 2006), 
the Tenth Circuit held that § 261.5(c) qualifies as a crime of violence under the illegal 
reentry guideline.  However, there the defendant did not raise an overbreadth challenge 
and the Court did not apply the categorical approach, instead deeming California 
statutory rape a crime of violence simply because “statutory rape” is an enumerated 
offense in the Guidelines. 
  As such, we 
cannot say that Ascencion-Carrera has met his burden of proving that the District Court 
committed plain error.  See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993) (error is 
“plain” when it is “clear under current law”); United States v. Harris, 471 F.3d 507, 512 
(3d Cir. 2006) (error not plain where neither the Supreme Court nor Third Circuit had 
ruled on issue in a precedential opinion).  Moreover, that this is a point upon which 
reasonable minds could differ is evidenced by related opinions further undermining our 
ability to find that any error was plain.  See United States v. Viezcas-Soto, 562 F.3d 903, 
914 (8th Cir. 2009) (Gruender, J., dissenting) (“It seems to me that a definition of 
‘statutory rape’ that excludes the statutory rape laws of seventeen states, including the 
most populous state in the Union [California], along with Texas [age of consent 17], New 
York [17], Florida [18], and Illinois [17], cannot reasonably be classified as ‘generic.’”); 
United States v. Alvarado-Hernandez, 465 F.3d 188, 189-90 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding 
5 
 
Texas statutory rape statute, setting threshold age of 17, meets generic, contemporary 
definition of statutory rape triggering sentence enhancement under the Guidelines).  
Accordingly, we affirm the sentence imposed by the District Court. 
